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PublThe present analog study compared the effectiveness of an acceptance- and control-based intervention on pain tolerance using a cold
pressor task, and is a partial replication and extension of the Hayes, Bissett et al. (Hayes, S. C., Bissett, R.T., Korn, Z., Zettle, R. D.,
Rosenfarb, I. S., Cooper, L. D., & Grundt, A. M. (1999). The impact of acceptance versus control rationales on pain tolerance. The
Psychological Record, 49, 33-47) study. Our aim was to test the effects of a nonspecific source of therapeutic change within the context of
ACT therapy. Otherwise healthy undergraduates (N=20) were exposed to a cold pressor task before, immediately after, and 10 min
following one of the two interventions. Half of the participants also were assigned to a high demand characteristic condition in which
the experimenter maintained close physical proximity, eye contact, and placed subtle social pressure on participants to please the
experimenter. The results showed that the most important factor influencing latency to withstand the cold pressor task was social
pressure. The acceptance-based intervention was more subject to demand than the control strategy. Evaluative ratings of pain were
unaffected by the demand manipulation. The current data suggest that demand characteristics can exert a significant positive impact
on the outcome of therapeutic protocols. The implications of this view for acceptance- and control-based psychosocial interventions are
discussed.ACCEPTANCE AND COMMITMENT therapy (ACT) is arelatively new behavioral psychotherapy that is pre-
dicated on several somewhat counterintuitive assumptions
about the nature of human suffering and its alleviation
(Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999). At the core of these
assumptions is the notion that psychological suffering (e.g.,
unwanted thoughts, memories, emotions, pain, overt acts)
is neither good nor bad, but rather a ubiquitous facet of
human life that need not get in the way of an individual
living a full and valued life. Clients, however, often enter
therapy with the view that in order to have a good life, one
must first eliminate or control the symptoms and sources of
suffering (i.e., thoughts and feelings). Quite often this takes
the formof experiential avoidance, or a tendency to engage
in behaviors to alter the frequency, duration, or form of
unwanted private events (i.e., thoughts, feelings, physiolo-
gical events, and memories) and the situations that
occasion them (Hayes, 1994a, 1994b; Hayes & Gifford,
1997; Hayes, Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999).
From an ACT perspective, experiential avoidance,
though not uniformly pathogenic, is thought to function-7229/07/381–393$1.00/0
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ished by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.as a core psychological diathesis underlying the develop-
ment and maintenance of several forms of psychopathol-
ogy (Blackledge & Hayes, 2001; Hayes & Wilson, 1993,
1994; Hayes, Wilson, Gifford, Follette, and Strosahl, 1996)
and human suffering more generally (see Hayes, Strosahl,
et al., 1999, for a review). Several somewhat independent
lines of research (e.g., thought and emotion suppression)
seem to support the notion that rigid and inflexible (i.e.,
context insensitive) attempts to suppress and control
unwanted private events are largely ineffective, and can
result in more (not less) unwanted thoughts and
emotions (e.g., Clark, Ball, and Pape, 1991; Feldner,
Zvolensky, Eifert, and Spira, 2003; Gold & Wegner, 1995;
Karekla, Forsyth, and Kelly, 2004; Lavy & van den Hout,
1990; Wegner, Schneider, Knutson, and McMahon, 1991;
see also Purdon, 1999, for a review), suffering and pain
(Gross & Levenson, 1997; Hayes, Bissett, et al., 1999;
McCracken et al., 1999), distress and restriction in life
functioning (Marx & Sloan, 2002), diminished contact
with meaningful and valued life activities, and poorer
overall quality of life (Hayes, 2004).
The mechanisms and processes by which experiential
avoidance develops and functions have yet to be fully
worked out empirically. ACT suggests that experiential
avoidance operates paradoxically and it does so, in large
part, because of the bi-directional nature of language
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(e.g., fear) of objects and events are present for their
referents and symbols (i.e., words and thoughts; see
Hayes, Barnes-Holmes, and Roche, 2001, for a more
detailed account). Thus, just as one can learn to respond
to avoid or escape external sources of fear and harm, one
can just as readily turn this capacity on oneself in an effort
to avoid, escape from, or minimize internal thoughts,
feelings, or bodily sensations that may be unpleasant or
hurt. This struggle, in turn, takes enormous energy and
effort, tends not to yield the desired outcomes (i.e., relief,
feeling better) in the long-term, and can bring about the
very things that the person wishes not to experience.
Though experiential avoidance can be conceptualized
as an inflexible, broad-band, emotion regulation strategy,
its assessment is nonetheless limited to self-report (i.e.,
Acceptance and Action Questionnaire [AAQ]; Hayes et
al., 2004). This is somewhat problematic given that
experiential avoidance refers to overt behavior rather
than reports of subjective feelings regarding the desire to
avoid aversive events. Thus, there is a real need for direct
and unobtrusive behavioral indices of experiential avoid-
ance. Additionally, it is worth noting that experiential
avoidance itself is not problematic or even pathogenic
(see Forsyth, Eifert, & Barrios, 2006). For instance,
avoiding an oncoming car makes adaptive sense.
Avoidance, and particularly experiential avoidance,
can become problematic because it denotes a broad-band
rule-governed form of emotion-regulatory behavior that,
by definition, tends to yield insensitivity to prevailing
contingencies that demand an approach response. For
instance, a person might say, “I want to see my kid’s soccer
game (approach) but am unwilling to have the back pain
that my history tells me will occur when sitting and
standing at the game” (avoidance). This approach-
avoidance conflict, in turn, appears to create distress
and the kinds of functional impairment seen clinically. It
also points to why acceptance may be a vital alternative
(i.e., acceptance transforms the approach-avoidance
conflict into approach-approach, or no conflict; see
Forsyth et al., 2006).
To foster psychological flexibility and to undermine
experiential avoidance, ACT therapists often make
extensive use of language that is nonlinear, such as
paradox and metaphor. The use of metaphor fits rather
well with other, more humanistic uses of metaphor in the
clinical setting (McCurry & Hayes, 1992), but it is
different in that specific ACT-relevant themes are always
the focus of such metaphorical talk. For instance, a client
suffering from an ongoing struggle with anxiety may be
presented in therapy with the metaphorical parallels
between her struggle and a set of Chinese finger cuffs
(i.e., the harder you struggle the tighter the cuffs become;
see Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 1999, p. 105; see also Eifert &Heffner, 2003, for an illustration of its use). Metaphors
expose clients to contingencies operating when emo-
tional control seems crucial and help to teach clients that
they might need to approach their problem from an
entirely different perspective.
ACT also places considerable emphasis on the client-
therapist relationship. Of course, such an emphasis is not,
in itself, unique. The relationship between the client and
the therapist has received considerable attention for
many decades from within and outside of behavior
therapy (e.g., Cordova & Kohlenberg, 1994; Rogers,
1951, 1967; Wright and Davis, 1994). With ACT, ther-
apeutic relationships are typically strong, intense, open,
confrontational, mutual, and accepting (Hayes, Strosahl,
et al., 1999). The therapeutic relationship within ACT is
considered important because it is based on; (a) a stance
toward oneself and others (e.g., acceptance and open-
ness) that is curative, (b) allows that stance to bemodeled,
and (c) creates a social context through which important
issues can be evoked. Finally, strong, open, loving, and
respectful relationships are usually a natural expression of
core values held by a client and a therapist.
Of course, the notion of acceptance is not new or
unique to ACT, and neither is concern about the
therapeutic relationship. What is new is the basic and
applied evidentiary-base emerging from within and out-
side of behavior therapy as applied to concepts such as
acceptance, mindfulness, value-guided change, and the
like, including manualization of intervention technolo-
gies flowing from this work. ACT also emerged from a
distinctly different philosophy of science known as
functional contextualism (see Hayes, 2004), and has
developed in tandem with a behavioral, functional-
analytic theory of language and cognition known as
relational frame theory (RFT; Hayes et al., 2001). The
impact of ACT has been studied with several populations,
but until recently the outcome data have been rather
limited (see Hayes et al., 2006, for a review). Some small
and less well-controlled clinical studies have shown ACT
to be an effective treatment for depression (Zettle, 1984;
Zettle & Rains, 1989) and anorexia (Heffner, Sperry,
Eifert, & Detweiler, 2002). Some well-controlled research
provides evidence that ACT is helpful with anxiety-related
problems (Carrascoso & Francisco, 1999; Hayes, 1987;
Roemer and Orsillo, 2002; Zettle, 2003), chronic drug
addiction (Walser & Hayes, 1995), depression in parents
with disabled children (Biglan, 1990), chronic pain
(Geiser, 1992; Korn, 1997; see also Dahl, Wilson, Luciano,
and Hayes, 2005), exhibitionism (Paul, Marx, and Orsillo,
1999), and in reducing rehospitalizations of inpatients
suffering from psychotic symptoms (Bach & Hayes, 2002).
The empirical analysis of ACT is still in its infancy,
however. Before outlining the current study, it is
important to consider one relevant empirical study that
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study, Hayes, Bissett, and colleagues (1999) chose cold
pressor pain (Hines & Brown, 1932) as an analog of
human suffering, in part, because it represents an aversive
stimulus that is easy to control in a laboratory setting
(Hayes, Bissett, et al., 1999). The authors examined the
behavioral and subjective impact of a brief control-based
versus an acceptance-based rationale on pain tolerance
during the cold pressor task. Brief ACT and control-based
rationales were used as the interventions because they
represent competing models of the nature of human
suffering and how best to alleviate it in psychotherapy,
and can be highly refined and targeted in the experi-
mental situation.
There were three coping rationales: acceptance-based,
control-based, and attention-placebo. The dependent
measures were length of time participants voluntarily
kept their hands in the cold pressor, subjective evaluations
of pain, unpleasantness, and sensation. Overall, the
acceptance group demonstrated greater pain tolerance
compared with the other groups. Interestingly, this effect
was not accounted for by a concomitant reduction in the
subjective experience of pain, a finding that can be
interpreted as being consistent with a positive ACT
outcome.
The current study represents a replication and
extension of the Hayes, Bissett, and colleagues (1999)
study with modifications of conceptual and practical
interest. Firstly, the current study aimed to assess the
impact of an acceptance-based rationale on pain toler-
ance when the effect of demand characteristics has been
removed. This is important, because any empirical
assessment of an emerging therapy should begin by
eliminating the effects of nonspecific factors that are
known to influence therapeutic outcomes. In both the
laboratory research context (e.g., Kantowitz, Roediger, &
Elmes, 1997) and in the context of therapy (Kanter,
Kohlenberg, & Loftus, 2002), demand characteristics are
always placed on the subject or client, whether intended
or not (see Orne, 1962; Rosenthal, 2002; Rosnow, 2002).
In experimental settings, demand characteristics include
obvious and subtle cues about the experimental hypoth-
esis that influence subject behavior, whereas in clinical
settings demand characteristics include therapist beha-
viors that influence client behaviors in the expected
direction (e.g., therapist authority, wishes, expectations,
prescriptions, and worldviews; see Kanter et al., 2002;
Orne, 1962).
Experimenters and clinicians alike normally go to
great lengths to control for the effects of demand
characteristics so that behavior change may be con-
fidently attributed to the independent variable (i.e.,
intervention or treatment). Given that ACT depends
upon a particularly intense therapeutic relationship, itwould not be surprising if some of the effects of ACTwere
due to demand characteristics placed on clients in the
therapeutic setting. Acknowledging that ACT explicitly
attempts to undermine client efforts to please the
therapist does not negate the importance of quantifying
the impact of demand characteristics in the context of
acceptance-based coping rationales. Thus, in the current
study, the role of demand characteristics in the effective-
ness of both an acceptance-based and control-based
rationale was addressed by manipulating aspects of the
experimenter’s interpersonal behavior so as to increase
or decrease the intimacy of a social interaction, namely,
eye contact, physical proximity, and verbal statements
that conveyed therapist expectations about participant
behavior.
A second issue requiring consideration in any systema-
tic study of acceptance-based rationales is the relative
importance of metaphors used in the therapy context.
More specifically, if metaphors have an appreciable
impact on therapy outcome (Berlin, Olson, Cano, &
Engel, 1991; see McCurry & Hayes, 1992, for a review),
then their effect needs to be considered in any
therapeutic intervention with which ACT is compared.
Specifically, while the context of acceptance- and control-
based therapies obviously differ in terms of rationales and
approach, they also differ enormously in their presenta-
tion of the therapy protocols and the behavior expected
of the client. Thus, the abundance of metaphor used
within ACT is not inconsequential and may even be
crucial. In the current study, therefore, we used meta-
phors within both the acceptance-based and control-
based rationales in an attempt to provide a balanced
evaluation of their effects on overt pain tolerance and self-
report of pain.
Consistent with Hayes, Bissett, and colleagues (1999),
we anticipated that participants who received the accep-
tance rationale would keep their hands in the cold pressor
longer than participants who received the control-based
rationale. Moreover, we anticipated increased pain
tolerance would not covary reliably with reductions in
subjective evaluations of pain, on the grounds that
changes in private events are not viewed as central to
positive ACT outcomes (see Hayes, Strosahl, et al., 1999).
We also expected that demand characteristics would
influence pain tolerance across the rationales, and that an
interaction between therapeutic rationale and level of
demand characteristics would be observed.
Method
Participants
Twenty undergraduate volunteers (14 females, 6 males;
Mage=19.95; SD=2.35) from the National University of
Ireland, Maynooth, participated. Participants were
recruited via campus announcements and via postings
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cipant pool. They were not remunerated in any way. All
volunteers were asked if they suffered from any medical
condition, such as Reynaud’s disease, diabetes, or high
blood pressure, that may preclude exposure to cold water.
None of the volunteers reported any of these conditions.
They were not screened for drug dependency, the
presence of chronic pain conditions, or degree of distress
tolerance. In effect, the sample was a random sample of
university undergraduates employed for experimental
convenience.
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the
following four conditions: acceptance rationale under
high demand, acceptance rationale under low demand,
control rationale under high demand, and control
rationale under low demand. No participant had pre-
viously participated in a study on pain tolerance.
Apparatus and Materials
Cold pressor task. An ice box (measuring approximately
35.56 cm×38.09 cm) containing ice water at 1 degree
centigrade was used for the cold pressor task. A wire
mesh was used to separate the ice from the water, and
to keep the ice away from participants’ hands.
Participants were asked to roll up their sleeve, remove
any jewelery on their nondominant hand, and to
immerse that hand in the ice water. The duration of
each test (i.e., hand immersion until removal) was
measured in seconds using a stopwatch.
Intervention protocols. Both the acceptance- and control-
based protocols consisted of a brief one-on-one thera-
peutic intervention delivered by a female experimenter.
Due to resource limitations, it was not possible to
randomize the gender of the experimenter. For the sake
of experimental control, each intervention (approxi-
mately 8 minutes in length) was carefully scripted and
was read verbatim to participants.
The acceptance rationale attempted to teach partici-
pants to accept and acknowledge the presence of negative
thoughts and feelings, emphasizing the ineffectiveness of
attempts to control private events as a strategy to manage
pain (see Appendix A). Consistent with Hayes, Bissett,
and colleagues (1999), the control rationale attempted to
teach participants that perseverance and determination
were important tools for dealing with negative thoughts
and feelings, that they should never give in to these
negative private events, but rather attempt to master and
control them (see Appendix B). That is, control was
emphasized as a viable strategy for pain management (see
also Caudill, 2002; Philips & Rachman, 1996; Sternbach,
1987; Turk, Meichenbaum, & Genest, 1983). To illustrate
the concepts, the “polygraph metaphor” (see Hayes,
Strosahl, & Wilson, 1999) was used for the acceptance-
based group (see Appendix A). Similarly, to illustrate theutility of struggle and continued control efforts, the
popular metaphorical story of “two mice who fell into a
bucket of cream” was used for the control-based group
(see Appendix B).
After the administration of a rationale, each partici-
pant was provided with a metaphorical exercise (referred
to hereafter as a “physical metaphor”). For the accep-
tance groups, the Chinese handcuffs metaphor was used.
Chinese handcuffs consist of a hollow tube of woven straw
approximately 5 inches in length. Participants were
required to push one index finger into each end, and
then to try to pull their fingers out. Typically individuals
are unable to remove their fingers unless they give up on
the intuitive strategy of pulling and instead nonintuitively
push their fingers towards each other to loosen the grip of
the handcuffs (see Eifert & Heffner, 2003). The control-
based intervention groups were provided with a solvable
handheld puzzle as a physical metaphor. The aim of the
puzzle was to maneuver a number of small steel balls from
an outer maze to a smaller, inner maze. This required
continued perseverance (an intuitive strategy) for the
puzzle to be solved.
State anxiety. The Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory Form Y (STAI-S-T; Spielberger et al., 1983)
consists of two 20-item questionnaires used routinely to
assess state and trait levels of anxiety in clinical and
nonclinical populations (alphas= .86 to .95 in adult and
college student samples; test-retest reliability ranges from
r= .71 to .86; Spielberger et al., 1983). For the purposes of
the current study, only items measuring state anxiety were
used.
Evaluative ratings of pain experience. A three-part self-
report, based on Melzack and Wall (1965), was used by
Hayes, Bissett, and colleagues (1999) to assess self-report
of felt pain, unpleasantness, and sensation associated with
a cold pressor task. A similar assessment was utilized in the
present study. Participants were instructed to rate felt pain
(intensity), unpleasantness (degree of adversity of the
experience), and sensation (total sensation, not just pain)
using three Likert-type visual analog scales (10-unit
increments), anchored from 0=none at all to 100= extremely
unpleasant.
Procedure
Pre-intervention baseline. Participants meeting inclusion
criteria were escorted to a dimly lit 1.83×4.08 m room and
were seated in a comfortable recliner chair in one corner
of the room. The experimenter, unless otherwise indi-
cated, sat in a normal desk chair at the opposite corner of
the room, so that the participants and the experimenter
were diagonally facing one another. Following consent,
participants completed the STAI-S, and were then
instructed to place their nondominant hand in the
container of ice-cold water. They were to let their hand
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were instructed to “remove it when it was no longer
comfortable.” During the cold pressor task, the experi-
menter sat approximately 2.4 m away from all participants
and made minimal eye contact. The cold pressor task was
terminated when participants removed their hand from
the container. Participants were then instructed to rate
their immersion experience (i.e., intensity, unpleasant-
ness, and sensation) by placing a mark anywhere along
the line of each scale. The experimenter then exited the
experimental room and informed participants that she
would be absent for approximately 10 minutes. During
this break, participants were provided with a dry cotton
towel and popular periodical reading materials to peruse
(e.g., Time and Cosmopolitan magazines). The purpose of
the 10-minute break was to allow time for the nondomi-
nant hand to warm and return to baseline levels prior to
starting the next phase.
Brief rationale and manipulation of demand characteristics.
Following the break, the experimenter reentered the
experimental room and delivered either an acceptance-
based or control-based rationale. Thereafter, partici-
pants were provided with a physical metaphor (i.e.,
Chinese handcuffs or hand puzzle) and were asked to
explore it for approximately 2 minutes. Participants
were then asked what (if anything) they had learned
from the activity, and were allowed to extemporize the
meaning of the physical metaphor for approximately
1 minute, with no additional comments by the
experimenter.
Following this period, participants were administered
the STAI and the cold pressor task as before. This time,
however, extent of demand characteristics placed on
participants was manipulated just prior to the cold
pressor task. In the high demand condition, the
experimenter sat approximately .61–.91 m away from
each participant, maintained consistent eye contact, and
said, “It is important that you do your best for me.” In
the low demand condition, the experimenter sat
approximately 2.4 m away from participants, made
minimal eye contact, and made no request to “do your
best for me.” Upon completion of the second cold
pressor task, participants were asked to make their
evaluative ratings of pain intensity, unpleasantness, and
sensation. A second 10-minute break period followed.
During this break, participants were provided with dry
cotton towels, reading materials, and their respective
physical metaphors. The experimenter encouraged
participants to spend the 10-minute period exploring
the physical metaphors, while keeping in mind what was
discussed during the intervention phase.
Follow-up assessment. Following the break, participants
completed the STAI-S for a third time, and were then
immediately exposed to the cold pressor task as before.The manipulation of the level of demand characteristics
was maintained as in the previous trial. All participants
were again instructed to remove their hand when it was no
longer comfortable, and evaluative ratings (i.e., intensity,
unpleasantness, and sensation) followed immediately
upon participant termination of the task. Participants
were then debriefed, and asked not to discuss the study
with other individuals.
Data Analytic Strategy
The primary dependent variables (i.e., cold pressor
latency, evaluative ratings, and state anxiety) were
analyzed separately using a series of 2 (Intervention:
Acceptance vs. Control)×2 (Demand: High vs. Low)
mixed model ANOVAs, with a third repeated measures
factor added to evaluate changes over time (i.e., baseline,
post-intervention, and follow-up). Geisser-Greenhouse
degrees of freedom adjustments are reported for
repeated measures analyses in cases where the sphericity
assumption was violated. Partial eta-squared (η2) was
adopted as an index of effect size, and specific compar-
isons of theoretical interest were evaluated using single
degree of freedom contrasts for main effects, simple main
effects, and the anticipated interaction of Demand×In-
tervention (see Jaccard, 1998). When appropriate, a
Holm’s modified Bonferroni approach was used to
control for experimentwise error (Holm, 1979), as this
correction is more powerful than more traditional
approaches (i.e., Tukey test and the Bonferroni correc-
tion) used routinely to control for artificial inflation of
Type I error rates.
Results
Cold Pressor Duration
Table 1 illustrates means and standard deviations of
cold pressor duration (sec) as a function of intervention
group and demand condition. Though cold pressor
duration did not discriminate between groups at baseline,
it did increase significantly from baseline to post-
intervention and follow-up, as supported by the main
effect for Time, F(2, 32)=6.51, pb .004, η2 = .29 (Time
1bTime 2bTime 3; all pairwise comparisons, pb .05).
Yet, extent of increase also varied reliably as a function
of the demand condition, as indexed by a significant
Demand×Time interaction, F(2, 32)= 6.51, pb .034,
η2 = .29 (moderate effect). Follow-up contrasts showed
that this interaction resulted from participants in the
high demand condition showing a significantly greater
increase in cold pressor durations (i.e., more pain
tolerance) at follow-up relative to baseline when com-
pared to the flat and stable pattern of responding for
participants in the low demand condition (Mdiff High
minus Low Demand=+64.80 sec; SE=28.87; t [18]=2.24,
pb .039, η2 = .29; CI=3.60 to 125.99). Cold pressor duration
Table 1
Means and standard deviations of cold pressor durations (sec) for the acceptance and control-based intervention groups under conditions of
high and low demand
Phases Intervention
Acceptance-based Control-based
High demand Low demand High demand Low demand
Baseline 68.4 (48.9) 50.8 (61.7) 42.0 (28.2) 37.6 (31.0)
Post-Intervention 143.4a (121.2) 44.8b (25.9) 62.2 (26.7) 75.0 (77.8)
10 min follow-up 171.2a (129.8) 34.2b (15.8) 85.0 (53.7) 70.4 (82.5)
Note. N=20; Standard deviations appear in parentheses. Means with different superscripts differ for pairwise comparisons of high and low
demand within intervention conditions.
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nate between demand conditions.
Though the anticipated Intervention×Time interac-
tion was not significant, there was a modest trend
supporting a three-way Intervention×Demand×Time
interaction, F(2, 32)=3.24, pb .052, η2 = .17 (moderate
effect). Prior to the intervention, performance for the
acceptance- and control-based groups were comparable
under conditions of high (Mdiff Acceptance minus
Control=+26.4 sec) and low (Mdiff Acceptance minus
Control=+13.2 sec) demand. Simple main effects analysis
showed that under high demand, the acceptance group
consistently outperformed the control-based group at
post-intervention relative to baseline (Mdiff Acceptance
minus Control = +81.00 sec; SE = 32.70; t(18) = 2.48,
pb .025; η2 = .28; CI=11.67 to 150.33), but not at follow-
up. Yet, under low demand, the pattern was reversed, but
not significantly so.
Under low demand, the acceptance group showed a
worsening pattern at post-intervention (Mdiff Acceptance
minus Control=− .17.2 sec) and follow-up (Mdiff Accep-
tance minus Control=−49.4 sec) relative to the control-
based intervention group. This was borne out by the
interaction contrasts (i.e., [Acceptance minus Control]
under High Demand minus [Acceptance minus Control]
under Low Demand) at post-intervention, and to a lesser
extent at follow-up. Under high demand, the post-
intervention difference between the acceptance over the
control-based group was significantly greater than the
difference between groups observed under low demand
(Mdiff = +98.2; SE=46.25; t [18] =2.12, pb .05; η
2 = .22;
CI= .15 to 196.25). A similar trend also was observed at
follow-up (Mdiff=+109.20; SE=57.74; t [18]=1.81, pb .07;
η2 = .18; CI=−13.19 to 231.59).
Given that the above three-way interaction suggests
that the effectiveness of the acceptance rationale is more
dependent on demand compared to the control-based
rationale, we sought to compare performance (i.e.,
mean response at post-intervention and follow-up
relative to baseline) of both intervention groups withinconditions of high vs. low demand. These simple effect
analyses showed that tolerance for the cold pressor was
significantly greater for the high demand acceptance
group (Mdiff = +88.90) relative to the low demand
acceptance group (Mdiff=−11.30), t(8)=2.41, pb .043. By
contrast, performance of participants in the control-based
intervention groups were equivalent under conditions of
high (Mdiff =+31.60) vs. low demand (Mdiff=+35.10 sec),
pN .05, and suggestive of overall improvement over
time.
Evaluative Ratings of Pain
Evaluative ratings for pain intensity, unpleasantness,
and sensation are displayed in Table 2. Contrary to
expectation, omnibus tests of pain intensity, sensation,
and unpleasantness ratings across the three assessment
points did not yield the expected effects for Intervention,
Demand, nor their interaction. Using a logic similar to
that used for cold pressor performance, we then
calculated the difference in post-intervention and fol-
low-up ratings over baseline, as the rationale for the
interventions and demand manipulation were not intro-
duced until after the baseline. Using this approach,
participants in the acceptance group showed an increase
in pain intensity at post-intervention relative to baseline
(Mdiff=+11.0), followed by a subsequent reduction to
base-line levels at follow-up (Mdiff=0.0). Participants in
the control-based condition showed attenuated reports of
pain intensity from baseline to intervention and a
worsening at follow-up (Mdiff =−1.5 and Mdiff =+9.0,
respectively). This was supported by a significant Inter-
vention×Time interaction, F(1, 16)=6.73, pb .02, η2 = .30
(moderate effect). A similar Intervention×Time interac-
tion was observed for ratings of pain sensation, F(1, 16)=
6.84, pb .019, η2 = .30 (moderate effect). This interaction
was due, in large part, to the acceptance group showing a
large decrease in pain sensation from post-intervention
(Mdiff=−2.5) to follow-up (Mdiff=−18.0) relative to the
control-based intervention group that showed a somewhat
stable pattern across both time periods (Mdiff=+4.5 and
Table 2
Means and standard deviations of evaluative ratings of pain during the cold pressor task as a function of intervention group and demand
condition
Pain ratings Intervention
Acceptance-based Control-based
Intensity High demand Low demand High demand Low demand
Baseline 58.0 (13.0) 48.0 (19.2) 68.0 (37.5) 50.0 (24.5)
Post-Intervention 69.0 (19.5) 55.0 (25.5) 61.0 (37.1) 54.0 (34.3)
10 min follow-up 58.2 (28.4) 44.0 (27.0) 70.0 (39.4) 61.0 (25.6)
Unpleasantness
Baseline 72.0 (19.2) 54.0 (21.9) 68.0 (36.5) 62.0 (31.1)
Post-Intervention 60.0 (21.5) 54.0 (20.7) 57.0 (38.3) 50.0 (31.6)
10 min follow-up 54.0 (24.1) 51.0 (28.4) 39.0 (33.2) 55.0 (39.0)
Sensation
Baseline 78.0 (16.4) 66.0 (15.2) 87.0 (9.7) 76.0 (18.2)
Post-Intervention 75.0 (19.4) 64.0 (16.7) 90.0 (11.7) 82.0 (24.9)
10 min follow-up 60.0 (25.5) 50.0 (31.0) 88.0 (13.0) 89.0 (16.7)
Note.N=20; Standard deviations appear in parentheses. High ratings indicate more negative evaluations of the effects of the cold pressor task.
387Acceptance, Control, and PainMdiff =+7.0, respectively). Contrary to expectation, ratings
of unpleasantness did not vary reliably across time, nor by
intervention group or demand condition. No other
effects were significant.
State Anxiety
State anxiety ratings across the three assessment
periods appear in Table 3. State anxiety varied by Time,
F(2, 32)=9.45, pb .001, η2 = .37, and Intervention×Time, F
(2, 32)=4.10, pb .026, η2 = .20, but not by demand
condition. Relative to baseline, post-intervention state
anxiety ratings were significantly greater in the accep-
tance-versus control-based group (Mdiff Acceptance
minus Control = +7.2; SE = 2.72; t [18] = 2.64, pb .02;
η2 = .30; CI=1.43 to 12.97). Moreover, simple main effect
contrasts showed that state anxiety was significantly
elevated in the acceptance group compared to the
control-based group, but only within the high demand
condition (Mdiff Acceptance minus Control =+10.4;
SE=3.85; t [18]=2.70, pb .02; η2 = .31; CI=2.34 to 18.56).
Similarly, state anxiety at follow-up (relative to baseline)
was greater in the acceptance-compared to the control-
based group (Mdiff Acceptance minus Control=+6.6;
SE=2.77; t [18]=2.38, pb .03; η2 = .26; CI= .73 to 12.46),
and particularly under conditions of high demand (Mdiff
Acceptance minus Control=+11.6; SE=3.91; t [18]=2.96,
pb .009; η2 = .35; CI=3.30 to 19.89). Overall, reported state
anxiety attenuated across time periods. Such attenuation
was greatest from baseline to follow-up for those in the
control-based intervention group compared to the accep-
tance group, and particularly under conditions of high
demand. No other effects were significant.Discussion
This preliminary study sought to evaluate the effects of
two brief interventions that represent competing models
of behavior change (i.e., acceptance- vs. control-based
rationales) on overt pain behaviors and self-reported
response to an aversive cold pressor task. A related aim
was to further disentangle the contribution of therapist
demand characteristics to both approaches. The results
showed that demand characteristics can significantly
influence overt forms of pain behavior. Importantly,
such demands appeared to work with the acceptance
rationale to exert a positive effect on cold pressor
performance, particularly for participants who received
the acceptance-based rationale under conditions of high
demand. The very large improvements observed for this
group suggest that acceptance-based rationales can have a
significant impact on pain behavior, even if only under
specific conditions.
From these findings it would appear that the accep-
tance-based rationale was more subject to demand
characteristics than the control-based rationale, which
produced consistent improvements in cold pressor per-
formance under conditions of both high and low demand.
This finding, though preliminary, suggests one of several
necessary conditions that may moderate the effectiveness
of acceptance-based interventions. Other relevant mod-
erators may include the history of the client or the nature
of presenting problems. It may be the case that control
interventions are more effective than acceptance inter-
ventions in some, but not all, clinical contexts, with some
therapists and not others, and for some problems and not
others. Without analyses to investigate this possibility, the
Table 3
State anxiety scores for the acceptance- and control-based intervention groups under conditions of high and low demand
Phases Intervention
Acceptance-based Control-based
High demand Low demand High demand Low demand
Baseline 29.6 (3.2) 33.8 (3.9) 40.0 (11.7) 32.0 (9.8)
Post-Intervention 32.8 (4.9) 38.0 (9.6) 32.8 (12.2) 32.2 (9.8)
10 min follow-up 28.2 (2.9) 31.4 (4.8) 27.0 (8.1) 28.0 (6.4)
Note. N=20; Standard deviations appear in parentheses.
388 Roche et al.study of acceptance-based interventions will amount to
littlemore than a series of demonstration studies outlining
its utility in a variety of contexts. What is urgently required,
therefore, is a systematic program of research into the
optimal conditions for the use of acceptance-based
therapeutic strategies and the specific problems and
clients for whom it works best.
It is important to acknowledge that there were large
and interesting variations in cold pressor performances
across time for all groups. For instance, while the
acceptance/high demand group showed consistent and
large improvements in pain tolerance from baseline to
post-intervention to follow-up, the other group did not. In
particular, the control-based/low demand group showed
large improvements from baseline to post-intervention,
but very little improvement thereafter. The reasons for
these variations are impossible to disentangle with such a
small sample. Nevertheless, these differences point to
important variances in the trajectories of intervention
effects across the groups. At face value they would appear
to suggest that acceptance may lead to sustained
improvements, whereas the effects of control may be
more acute. Only further research in both laboratory and
applied contexts can adequately address this issue.
It could be argued from an ACT perspective that the
failure of the acceptance protocol to have a large effect on
cold pressor performance under conditions of low
demand is not entirely unexpected. More specifically,
the ACT literature suggests that clients in therapy may
sometimes get worse before they get better. The “dirty
glass” metaphor explains this phenomenon in the
following manner: The healing process is like cleaning
out a dirty glass with sand on the bottom: the only way to
do it is to “stir up the dirt.” Thus, one might expect that
acceptance-based interventions (as opposed to other
interventions) would yield sensitization to aversive stimuli
in the early phases of therapy (i.e., when the individual
begins to fully confront the aversive properties of the
private or public stimuli being avoided; see Wilson &
Luciano, 2002). Consistent with the notion of the dirty
glass metaphor, participants in the present study may have
shown further improvement, following an initial worsen-ing, had we taken additional assessments over a longer
period of time. If this is the case, however, it is unclear why
participants under high demand outperformed their low
demand acceptance counterparts in the short term. The
inclusion of further follow-ups at longer time intervals
may indeed help address this issue.
Subjective ratings of the pain experience did not reveal
any consistent patterns, with both groups showing both
increases and decreases in pain ratings from baseline to
post-intervention to follow-up. Closer inspection of the
patterns suggest that, at best, acceptance yielded account
worsening of pain intensity and sensation, followed by
improvement, whereas the reverse was true for those in
the control-based condition. Interestingly, Hayes, Bissett,
and colleagues (1999) also failed to show that subjective
evaluations of pain discriminated between intervention
groups. However, those researchers interpreted this
finding as supportive of the ACT perspective, insofar as
the acceptance rationale resulted in greater pain toler-
ance but not concomitant attenuation of subjective pain
experience. Though this outcome has been interpreted as
indirect evidence supporting the view that acceptance
influences the synchrony between feelings and overt
behavior, it is unclear how we might interpret the various
increases in negative subjective reports observed for the
acceptance-based group in the current study.
While subjective pain reports did not yield any
particularly consistent patterns across experimental
groups, the STAI did reveal important group differences.
Specifically, the control-based intervention group showed
greater attenuation of state anxiety across time compared
to the acceptance group. However, the observed reduc-
tion in state anxiety over time, coupled with the finding
that participants collectively kept their hands in the ice
water longer over time, suggests that some (not all) of the
observed effects may have been due to habituation
processes.
Overall, the present findings provide modest support
that acceptance rationales confer benefits on managing
acute pain behavior without changing the nature of pain-
related subjective evaluations, and suggest that the out-
come of acceptance-based rationales in laboratory pain
389Acceptance, Control, and Painstudies, and possibly even in the clinical setting, are subject
to significant demand effects. Control-based rationales, by
contrast, may be less sensitive to therapist demand.
Although the sample size was limited and the current
study was analog in nature, many of the observed effects
were quite robust. We anticipate that the observed effects
would have been even stronger with a larger sample size.
Replications and extensions of this work, with clinical and
nonclinical samples, is needed, particularly as ACT is
attracting increased attention within the behavior therapy
movement, and is being described as an innovative “third
wave” alternative to mainstream psychosocial interven-
tions (see Hayes, 2004).
One obvious next step would be to evaluate such
treatment rationales coupled with various demand
manipulations in the context of other more clinically
relevant aversive stimuli. For instance, the cold pressor
task is arguably a discrete aversive stimulus, with a clear
external source. As such, it is unlikely to induce great
emotional concern. On the other hand, ACT is typically
used for clients with problems that are highly personal,
emotional, and chronic, and for clients that are highly
motivated to seek a solution. If this is the case, then
commitment to value-based action may be an intrinsic
part of the acceptance process, and we should expect that
the nature of the aversive stimulus may have a major
impact on the suitability of ACT as a treatment paradigm.
Future research exploring this notion may wish to vary
pain levels or, alternatively, use other provocation
procedures (e.g., hyperventilation, loud noise) capable
of inducing emotional distress of longer durations.
Indeed, analog research designed to arrange contingen-
cies such that even mild levels of emotional or psycholo-
gical distress are associated with costs, may best function
as an analog to the kinds of contingencies clients
experience in their natural environment (see Forsyth et
al., 2006). Such manipulations would likely have the effect
of increasing emotional involvement with the aversive
stimulus and/or increasing motivation to respond differ-
ently to pain and distress.
Several methodological limitations to the current study
merit considerations in light of the potentially clinically
significant findings outlined thus far. Firstly, we acknowl-
edge that our manipulation of demand characteristics
was, for purposes of experimental integrity, limited to
several obvious variables that may not fully capture the
relevant components of therapist demands placed on
clients, regardless of treatment approach. It might be
argued, therefore, that the current study is not a realistic
analog of real therapeutic process. Future research of this
type may wish to specify how demand characteristics
operate alone, or in combination with therapist char-
acteristics (e.g., charisma) and treatment technologies, to
influence both analog and clinical therapeutic outcomes.Another methodological concern relates to the use of a
nonstandard cold pressor procedure. More specifically,
the cold pressor task traditionally involves bringing all
subjects’ hands to the same temperature by placing them
in a bath of warm water (37C) before immersion in the ice
water. This procedure was not followed in the current
study. Thus, it remains a possibility that the use of a more
standardized procedure may alter outcomes in a signifi-
cant way. While we are doubtful that this methodological
change had a major influence on the results (i.e., all
participants were treated the same, short of the interven-
tions), future research should ensure that subjects’ hands
are at equivalent temperatures prior to immersion in ice
water. This will allow systematic study outcomes to be
more easily compared.
The use of a gender-biased sample may also have
affected on the research findings such as to limit their
applicability to the general population. Specifically, given
known gender differences in pain tolerance under
laboratory conditions (e.g., Robinson, Wise1, Riley, &
Atchison, 1998), it is possible that our largely adult female
subject sample may have responded to experimental
manipulations in an idiosyncratic way. Indeed, the use of a
female experimenter may also have influenced the cold
pressor performance in ways not yet understood. Future
research is required to identify if this indeed is the case. If
it is the case that acceptance interventions are more
effective for one or the other gender, it is crucial that this
effect be examined functionally in the attempt to identify
the boundary conditions and core processes of accep-
tance phenomena.
Finally, there are several behavioral measures that
could have been employed here to predict the effective-
ness of the interventions, one of which was designed to
undermine control of private experience and the other of
which was designed to encourage further control of them.
Specifically, the AAQ (Hayes et al., 2004) and measures of
distress tolerance (see Brown, Lejuez, Kahler, Strong, &
Zvolensky, 2005) both provide indices of emotional
avoidance, a central target of acceptance interventions.
Thus, it may have been important to control for these
factors in the formation of experimental groups. Such
indices require urgent investigation if we are to under-
stand acceptance at a functional level. In the absence of
this type of detailed functional-analytic research, espe-
cially given the ever-widening range of problems to which
ACT is being applied, it may be perceived that acceptance-
based approaches such as ACT serve as “one-size fits all”
solutions to behavioral problems.
While several theoretical criticisms may be made
regarding the ecological validity of the current analog
study, it is important to appreciate that analog studies will
always be subject to such criticisms. A reliance on post-hoc
interpretation of these or other data is always potentially
390 Roche et al.misleading in the absence of additional supporting data.
In ACT, the possibility of interpretive errors is present due
to the absence of a clear empirical and laboratory
demonstrations of the core behavioral processes involved
in both acceptance and commitment (i.e., neither are
technical terms within behavior analysis), and the absence
of a clear outline of the anticipated trajectory of expected
clinical outcomes for both overt problem behaviors and
subjective reports. Such issues are important, in part,
because they have to do with the value and practical utility
of ACT, and subsequent efforts by researchers to provide
empirical evaluations of ACT at both the molar and
molecular level.
While ACT employed in-vivo may produce powerful
behavior change, it is crucial that the relevant operation-
ally defined variables are subject to experimental manip-
ulation. If operational definitions are not forthcoming,
then we run the risk of attributing any weak laboratory
effects for acceptance-based interventions to an inap-
propriate application of an acceptance protocol, or to
inappropriate protocol content, rather than to the
ineffectiveness of an acceptance strategy itself. Clearly
such interpretations do not serve the ultimate interests of
a truly scientific community.
Possible Implications for Clinical Practice
There are several broader implications that can be
derived from this work, and more generally from the
growing literature evaluating acceptance-based interven-
tions for persons suffering from chronic pain. For
instance, acceptance-based therapies such as ACT
emphasize the importance of the therapeutic stance
(Hayes & Strosahl, 2004). This therapeutic stance is one
whereby therapists model acceptance in a supportive
and nonconfrontational fashion. These behaviors may
serve as subtle demand characteristics, but they do seem
important when delivering ACT (i.e., modeling accep-
tance vs. modeling struggle and control over undesired
private content). This is why it is recommended that
therapists using ACT play with the concepts in their own
lives.
The emerging literature on acceptance-based inter-
ventions for persons with chronic pain suggests that
acceptance of pain is a much more robust predictor of
pain-related functional impairment than pain intensity
(McCracken, & Eccleston, 2005, 2006; Wicksell, Melin, &
Olsson, 2007; see also Dahl, Wilson, & Nilsson, 2004). The
tendency toward experiential avoidance is associated with
more pain severity and poorer functional outcomes.
Moreover, acceptance-based strategies such as those
described herein tend to yield better functional outcomes
compared with strategies teaching pain management and
control (Gutiérrez-Martínez, Luciano-Soriano, Rodríguez-
Valverde, & Fink, 2004).More broadly, the emerging basic and applied literature
points to the following more practical recommendations.
1. Therapists ought to explore strategies that foster
greater flexibility and acceptance of pain.
2. Acceptance-based strategies, including use of meta-
phor and experiential exercises such as those used
in the present study, ought to be integrated seam-
lessly into the therapeutic interaction as opposed to
being delivered in a canned fashion (e.g., “Here is a
metaphor …”).
3. Therapists ought to introduce and enact metaphors
experientially with clients versus verbally or imagin-
ally (e.g., Chinese finger cuffs, chess board, thought
cards, tug of war; see Dahl et al., 2005; Eifert &
Heffner, 2003). Such an approach allows clients to
make fuller contact with the exercise while provid-
ing an opportunity for new learning
4. Interventions designed to foster acceptance of pain
ought to be broadly contextualized in the service of
client values and goals. This is a strategy that was not
modeled in the present study. Values reflect aspects
of life that the client cares deeply about. Living in
accordance with these values is, in turn, associated
with a good quality of life, or more colloquially, a life
lived well. Placing values front and center in a
therapeutic intervention should serve to dignify the
treatment and make the hard work of therapy
worthwhile. Therapists will likely find that value-
guided interventions for chronic pain also serve an
important motivational function. Thus, we recom-
mend that therapists weave client values and
aspirations into any therapeutic strategy.
4. Though acceptance-based strategies for chronic
pain have yet to qualify as empirically supported
treatments (at least by Division 12 Task Force
standards), there are nonetheless several practical
clinical guides available for clinicians wishing to
apply ACT in working with chronic pain patients;
namely, Dahl and Lundgren’s (2006) Living Beyond
Your Pain: Using Acceptance and Commitment Therapy to
Ease Chronic Pain (for clients) and Dahl et al.’s
(2005) professional guide, Acceptance and Commit-
ment Therapy for Chronic Pain. Both books are
excellent resources for therapists wishing to apply
acceptance-based strategies, such as those outlined
in ACT, with clients suffering from chronic pain.
Appendix A. Acceptance-Based Protocol
We all encounter problems and difficulties in our lives.
If you think about the reasons you may give for the
problems you have, they can be categorized as having to
do with a thought or a feeling. So, what strategies do we
use when a thought or feeling gets in the way? Well, often
391Acceptance, Control, and Painwe struggle with them, try pushing them away, or try to
control them. Perhaps this is not a good idea, as trying to
control our thoughts and feelings only serves to intensify
them. For example, suppose I asked you not to think
about pink elephants for the next few minutes—do you
think you could do this? You see, if you try to distract
yourself by thinking of something else, then the whole
distractor becomes one big “don’t think about pink
elephants.” So, maybe not struggling with our thoughts
and feelings, and instead, accepting them and acknowl-
edging their presence, is a better option. Let me give you
some examples to illustrate what I mean.
Suppose I had you hooked up to a polygraph—one of
those machines that measures your blood pressure, heart
rate, respiration, and sweating—in short, how anxious you
are. And imagine this is the most sensitive machine ever
made. When you are all wired up to it there is no way you
can be aroused or anxious without the machine knowing
it. So, I tell you that you have a very simple task here: All
you have to do is stay relaxed. If you get the least bit
anxious, however, I will know it.
I want to give you an extra incentive, so I also have a
loaded gun, which I will hold to your head. If you just stay
relaxed, I won’t shoot you, but if you get nervous, I’m
going to kill you. In this scenario, what do you think would
happen? The tiniest bit of anxiety would be terrifying. Of
course you’d naturally be saying, “Oh my god I’m getting
nervous and anxious! Here it comes! BAMM!” How could
it work otherwise? So in other words, if I say, “Relax or I’ll
shoot you,” not only will it not work, but it’s the other way
around—the very fact that I would ask you to do this would
make you damn nervous.
The same principle works with feelings. It’s unmotivat-
ing to try to increase motivation and fail. Getting angry
over not being able to get rid of anger further perpetuates
the feeling. Its like a microphone feedback screech—you
know, that horrible screech a public address system some-
times makes? It happens when amicrophone is positioned
too close to a speaker. Then if someone taps the micro-
phone, the noise goes into the microphone; the sound
comes out of the speakers amplified and goes back into the
mike even louder than it was the first time it went in.
Being caught in the middle of a feedback screech is
like what I said about struggling with your thoughts and
feelings—the mechanism that amplifies negative
thoughts and feelings is our attempts to try to control
them. So what do you do? Well you try to live your life
tiptoeing around, hoping that if you are very quiet there
will be no feedback. But this isn’t feasible—you cannot
live without making noise. But what you have to notice
here is that, it’s not the amount of noise you make that’s
the problem. It’s the amplifier. So, the trick to preventing
further screeching (or, in other words, to help you live
your life quietly, free from negative thoughts and feelings)isn’t to move around the microphone more quietly, but to
unplug it from the amplifier.
So what I’m really trying to get at here is that in order
to deal with your problems, your negative thoughts or
feelings, simply acknowledge the fact they are there and
let go. Do not try to control what is happening or the
problem will just become more intensified.
Appendix B. Control-Based Protocol
We all encounter problems and difficulties in our lives.
If you think about the reasons you may give for the
problems you have, they can be categorized as having to
do with a thought or a feeling. So, what strategies do we
use when a thought or feeling gets in the way? Well it is
often the case that we want to push the thoughts or
feelings away or even struggle with them, and usually this
is a good idea. When we have a problem that is especially
difficult or baffling, there is one basic principle to apply
and keep applying. It is simply this: Never give up,
because to give up is to invite defeat. The key is to come
at your problems from a different way if the methods you
are using are not working. Keep searching and searching
until you find the solution to your problem.
Let me just give you an example to illustrate what I
mean here. Imagine you are standing facing an enormous
mountain. How are you going to get on the other side?
You might go around it, but it is too wide. You might then
decide to burrow underneath it, but it’s too deep. Then
you think to yourself, here’s the way: You rise above the
mountain mentally. If you can devise a mechanism that
can fly 40,000 ft high above mountains you can come up
with a type of thinking that can lift you above any
mountainous difficulty.
So, the idea is to hold a basic principle that it is always
too soon to quit. Always persevere in trying to reach a
solution to your problems. Always struggle and fight with
those negative thoughts or feelings. The affirmation of
strong perseverance, of keeping at it, of continuous,
undeviating effort is bound to pay off if you have the inner
compulsion to visualize it and stick with it.
Often a situation that may seem completely hopeless
will work out if you just keep trying. Let me tell you of a
little story that perfectly captures the power of the never-
give-up spirit and how perseverance can have unexpected
positive outcomes.
The story goes that there once were these two mice
that fell into a cup of cream. They struggled and
struggled, swimming around, trying to get out, but
could not. Eventually, one of the mice saw that it was no
longer worth its while and believed he was wasting his time
struggling, so he gave up and drowned, but the other kept
swimming and swimming, never giving up. As she
continued to struggle she had every reason to believe
that she was wasting her time. She could never have
392 Roche et al.imagined what happened next. With all her swimming the
cream began to turn to butter and soon it was thick
enough for her to walk to safety.
So, really what I’m trying to get at here is that the glib
excuse about circumstances beingbeyondour control is too
often used to rationalize a feeble giving up too soon. The
people who get on in this world are those who get up and
look for the circumstances they want, and if they can’t find
them,make them.That is the attitude that works wonders in
dealing with your problems, and your negative thoughts
and feelings. Sohold to the thought that it is always too soon
to quit. Don’t quit. You can if you think you can.References
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